Advantages of WatchGuard WIPS:
• Real prevention, not just detection • Marker Packet technology
• Accurately classifies devices on the wire with near zero false positives
• Detects, classifies and prevents NAT’d, encrypted, and soft APs
• Detects and blocks unauthorised client behaviour
• Auto prevention without harming neighbouring devices or networks
• Multiple threat prevention across multiple channels from a single sensor
• Blocks multiple types of 802.11 DoS attacks
• Wireless policies enforced per VLAN, SSID, and location
• Multi-VLAN support (up to 100 VLANs from a single sensor)
• Does not rely on CAM table look-ups or SNMP
• Mobile device watch list
• Off-line sensor mode (always-on security)
• Remote packet capture (R-PCAP) from any sensor
• Most accurate location-tracking from single sensor
• Ability to manage thousands of sensors from a single console
• Various automated security and compliance reports
• Ease of use and deployment / lowest TCO
• Exceeds DoD 8100.2 WIDS requirements
• Provides constant “no Wi-Fi” policy enforcement on wired VLANs in the network
5 Pitfalls of Competing WIPS Solutions All WIPS are NOT created equal and to help illustrate that point, consider these five pitfalls found in most competing WIPS solutions on the market:
1. Competing rogue AP detection Rogue APs can be defined as any unauthorised AP that is connected to an authorised network. Rogue APs are a serious threat to networks as they allow unauthorised wireless access to the private network. Rogue APs can appear on the network caused involuntarily by employees or due to malicious attempts of insiders. Many competing WIPS solutions utilise a flawed method to detect rogue APs in the LAN by declaring every AP seen in the air that does not belong to the list of authorised APs as rogue.
Such an approach has the following disadvantages: • False alarms: a security alert would be raised even if the non-authorised AP is seen in the air but not actually connected to the monitored wired network and as such does not pose any security threat. • Manual intervention: the system administrator has to manually examine the non-authorised APs visible in the air to decide which of them are actual rogue APs and which of them are external APs (i.e., neighbour APs). • No automatic instantaneous prevention: since it is highly undesirable to block neighbours’ APs accidentally or indiscriminately, instantaneous and automatic blocking of rogue APs is not possible with such an approach.